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t to University oð“Lingmu,” a survivor of the Cultural Revolution
½Wen 1995, p. 144ÞRecent scholarship directs us to the importance of endogenous factors for
understanding fashion and explaining cultural change more generally
ðLieberson 2000; Kaufman 2004Þ. This research reveals that fashion is its
own engine of change in a manner that “suggests a large measure of
independence from outside historical events” ðRobinson 1976, p. 1138Þ.
For instance, while the rise of the miniskirt in the 1960s might be inter-
preted as reﬂecting the inﬂuence of the women’s movement, it may also
have been driven solely by long-term cycles in women’s fashion concerning
hemlines, whereby the impetus to engage in marginal differentiation ac-
cumulates to become signiﬁcant change ðcf. Richardson and Kroeber 1940;
Lieberson 2000, pp. 93–98Þ. More generally, Lieberson argues that the
attribution of fashion trends to exogenous forces is often based on post hoc
reasoning. His analysis of fashion in “ﬁrst” or “given” names in Western
countries provides what is perhaps the strongest empirical support for the
importance of endogenous processes in relation to exogenous factors ðsee
also Besnard 1994; Salganik, Dodds, and Watts 2006Þ.
Yet despite the increasing evidence for the importance of endogenous
processes in Western fashion, their role would seem limited in contexts in
which politics permeates culture, as occurred in China during the Cultural
Revolution. From the Maoist regime’s inception in 1949, it engaged in a
series of aggressive interventions in cultural expression that has no parallel
in any of the countries studied by Lieberson—and perhaps none in human
history. At no time were these interventions as apparent as during the
Cultural Revolution, which began at the end of May 1966 and was ofﬁ-
cially declared over shortly after Mao’s death in 1976. The Cultural
Revolution seems to have “frozen fashion” in a vast array of cultural
domains. A salient example from the domain of apparel was the near-at the 2010 annual meetings of the Eastern Sociological Soci-
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When Politics Froze Fashionuniversality of “Mao suits”—buttoned-up jackets with rounded collars and
four patch pockets with ﬂaps ðGarrett 2007Þ. As attested by many pho-
tographs from the period, this suit was worn by many across the country,
regardless of sex, age, or occupation.
Existing theory points to two straightforward ways in which politics can
inﬂuence culture and could lead to the freezing of fashion. First, politics
can restrict the supply of cultural material. This mechanism is well known
from research in the “production of culture” tradition, where the focus is
on how industry structure ðin capitalist economiesÞ shapes the supply of
cultural forms ðsee Peterson and Anand ½2004 for a reviewÞ, but it can be
extended to include political structures insofar as they intervene in the
economy. The Maoist regime’s monopoly on the production, distribution,
and importation of cultural ðand otherÞ products meant that even those
Chinese who might wish to deviate from common cultural practices had
limited ability to do so. For example, some Chinese jokingly call the
Cultural Revolution “eight hundred million watching eight shows” ðBa yi
ren kan ba bu xiÞ, referring to the fact that only eight revolutionary operas
were permitted ðClark 2008, p. 3Þ. To return to the case of the Mao suit, a
major factor behind its widespread adoption was that, because of the
rationing of thread and cloth during the Great Leap Forward ð1958–61Þ,
“there was little choice but to wear clothes until they fell apart, or buy a
Mao suit” ðGarrett 2007, p. 219Þ.
A second way in which politics can inﬂuence culture is implied by re-
ﬂection theory ðsee Albrecht 1954; Griswold 1981; Kaufman 2004Þ. The key
idea is that individuals choosing a cultural practice select from a reper-
toire of practices that are privileged by the political environment ðSwidler
1986Þ. In Mao’s China—and, more speciﬁcally, during the Cultural Revolu-
tion—the regime made a concerted effort to reshape the cultural repertoire,
and many people’s choices during this period appear to reﬂect this. For ex-
ample, the Mao suit was associated with Sun Yat-sen, a founder of the Chi-
nese republic, and was later adopted by Mao Zedong and other leaders of
the Communist Party to symbolize the Communists’ inheritance of Sun’s re-
publican mantle. It also embodied important elements of the regime’s ideol-
ogy, such as the equality of individuals with respect to age, sex, and occupa-
tion. At the same time, individuals rejected other forms of dress—such as
the qipao, the traditional female dress, and Western three-piece suits—be-
cause they reﬂected the inﬂuences of traditional Chinese culture and West-
ern practices.
These two exogenous and speciﬁcally political mechanisms for shaping
culture—the restriction of cultural supply and the repertoire-shift effect—
seem so salient during the Cultural Revolution that it is questionable
whether endogenous processes were relevant at all. Yet theoretical con-557
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Alsiderations suggest that we consider an additional mechanism through
which politics inﬂuences fashion—what we label a “shift in the taste for
popularity” or the TFP-shift effect—the idea that political context shapes
fashion by triggering or dampening endogenous processes ðcf. Fishman
and Lizardo 2013Þ. In general, the reason to posit such a mechanism is that
while change in fashion may be driven by endogenous processes, it seems
necessary to posit some exogenous factor to explain fashion itself, that is,
why some social contexts have more variety and change in cultural prac-
tices than others. As Lieberson ð2000Þ and Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ
argue, underlying such differences in the degree of fashion across contexts
are shifts in the typical person’s “taste for popularity” ðTFPÞ—the desire to
differentiate himself or herself from common forms of cultural expression
rather than conform to them. The epigraphical quotation taken from
Simmel’s ð1957Þ classic essay on fashion hints at how politics might shift the
average TFP: the unconventionality that is the engine of fashion is avoided
by people who are “weak” or insecure ðsee also Phillips and Zuckerman
2001Þ. And as the epigraphic quotation from a survivor of the Cultural Rev-
olution exempliﬁes, such insecurity was common then.
To develop and test these ideas, we focus on the popularity distribution
of boys’ given names in Beijing before and after the onset of the Cultural
Revolution. The beginning of the Cultural Revolution marked a sharp
break that had immediate and dramatic effects on the cultural repertoire
and on individuals’ security in expressing difference. In short, and as
reviewed below, the Cultural Revolution was an ambitious and violent
attempt to remold culture by removing vestiges of Chinese “feudal” tra-
dition and Western “bourgeois” and “individualist” culture from all realms
of life, including dress, music, and hairstyles. Also, insofar as the violent
political chaos of the Cultural Revolution engendered deep feelings of in-
security in all Chinese citizens, we expect that this period involved a shift
in the average citizen’s TFP toward greater conformity, thus dampening
the operation of the endogenous mechanisms that produce fashion.
Our approach has three important advantages. First, the onset of the
Cultural Revolution in Beijing was sudden and had wide-ranging effects
on many people. This allows us to conduct a quasi experiment with a
before-and-after design, examining how the distribution of popularity of
boys’ given names was affected by these events.
Second, while the Maoist regime’s control over cultural production
caused an obvious constraint on the supply of cultural material, we follow
Lieberson and other recent researchers ðsee Besnard 1994; Gerhards and
Hackenbroch 2000; Gerhards 2005; Sue and Telles 2007; Berger and Le
Mens 2009; Gerhards and Hans 2009Þ and focus on a cultural domain in
which such restriction of cultural supply is irrelevant: fashion in given558
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When Politics Froze Fashionnames.2 At the same time, given names have important consequences for a
range of social and economic outcomes ðBertrand and Mullainathan 2004;
Aura and Hess 2010Þ, so we should be able to observe the impact of a po-
litical shift on the popularity of particular names.
Third, the particulars of Chinese naming practices provide good reason
to expect that the onset of the Cultural Revolution produced both a
repertoire-shift effect and a TFP-shift effect. Unlike Western names and
especially English names, most Chinese names have a meaning that is
salient to the audience. This suggests that political conditions that make
certain meanings more or less desirable are likely to affect what names
the parents consider ðcf. Weitman 1987Þ. This provides a strong basis for
expecting a repertoire shift whereby parents prefer names with politically
desirable content over names with politically undesirable or politically
neutral content. But we also argue and show below that the Cultural
Revolution had a more subtle effect on culture: It froze fashion by in-
creasing the desire to conform.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In the next section, we
discuss two mechanisms—the repertoire-shift effect and the TFP-shift
effect—by which politics can inﬂuence culture generally and naming prac-
tices in particular. In the following sections, we provide background on
Chinese naming practices and a historical overview that develops our
hypotheses about how the Cultural Revolution shaped naming practices
in China. Next, we discuss the data we collected and present our results.
We conclude by drawing lessons for our understanding of ðaÞ the political
culture of authoritarian regimes, ðbÞ the interaction of exogenous conditions
with endogenous cultural change, and ðcÞ the political foundations of indi-
vidual expression.MECHANISMS BY WHICH POLITICS CAN INFLUENCE CULTURE
As discussed above, supply-side factors aside, politics can inﬂuence cul-
ture through two demand-side mechanisms. The ﬁrst, which we label the
repertoire-shift effect, is implied by reﬂection theory ðsee Albrecht 1954;
Griswold 1981; Kaufman 2004Þ. The idea is that politics can change in-
dividuals’ preferences for content, leading many parents to choose polit-
ically desirable options—speciﬁcally, names. For example, in Germany, the
use of traditional German names ðsuch as Kurt, Ernst, and OttoÞ increased
between the two world wars, then sharply decreased after World War II
ðGerhards 2005, pp. 41–46Þ. This pattern seems to reﬂect the rise and fall2 In Chinese culture, a given name follows a surname. Accordingly, to avoid confusion,
we do not use the terms “ﬁrst” and “last” names.
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Alof fascist ideology. Similarly, politics might render a certain name less de-
sirable. Accordingly, in Germany after World War II, parents avoided the
name Adolf. Similarly, after the Civil Rights movement, many African-
Americans avoided names common among whites ðLieberson andMikelson
1995Þ. To the extent that many individuals prefer practices with politically
desirable content and avoid practices with politically undesirable content,
politics will be reﬂected in cultural expression.
The second way in which politics can affect culture is by changing the
form rather than the content of cultural expression ðcf. Fishman and Li-
zardo 2013Þ. In particular, what we label the TFP-shift effect is based on
the idea that politics can induce changes in the average individual’s
preference for conforming to ðas opposed to differentiating fromÞ popular
cultural practices. Much prior theory and research suggest that individuals
select practices not simply for their content but also for their relative
prevalence; Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ label this behavior an individual’s
“taste for popularity” ðsee also Lieberson 2000; Varnum and Kitayama
2011; cf. Berger and Le Mens 2009Þ.3 Below, we discuss theory that sug-
gests why the taste for popularity might vary within and between popu-
lations. For now, it is sufﬁcient to note ðsee Zuckerman ½in press for a
reviewÞ that people typically prefer a practice that is not so common that
they resemble everyone else ðe.g., it is awkward when one ﬁnds that one is
wearing exactly the same outﬁt as othersÞ and not so rare that one’s cul-
tural competence or commitment to the group becomes questionable ðe.g.,
wearing pajamas to a dinner partyÞ. Also, while it is difﬁcult to observe
TFP directly, there is some evidence that it is a stable trait. For example,
Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ use General Social Survey data to show that
parents with two children typically give both of them names similar in
popularity.
The TFP-shift effect describes the macro implications of a population-
level shift in the mean TFP.4 To appreciate how this effect operates, con-
sider ﬁrst how variation in TFP within a population acts as an endoge-
nous engine of cultural variety and change ðLieberson and Lynn 2003Þ.
Assume that the average member of the population prefers practices of
moderate popularity and that various subgroups in the population exhibit
continuous variation in their TFP, from the “innovators”—those with a3Note that the idea of a TFP is related to models of collective behavior based on
threshold effects ðsee Bass 1969; Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1978; Granovetter and
Soong 1983; Marwell and Oliver 1993Þ. The difference is that whereas a threshold is a
trigger for action based on a minimum level of popularity, a TFP is an ideal point in a
popularity distribution such that practices can be too popular as well as too unpopular.
4For a computational model that clariﬁes the internal logic of the informal model de-
scribed in the next two paragraphs, see the appendix below.
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When Politics Froze Fashionstrong preference for rare practices and a corresponding aversion to com-
mon practices—to the “conformists”—those who prefer the most common
practices and avoid rare practices ðcf. Rogers 2003Þ. Under these condi-
tions, once innovators make a rare practice somewhat popular, it will be
adopted by subgroups with ever-lower mean TFP, the practice diffusing
until it is embraced even by the conformists. But as it diffuses, it becomes
too popular for the innovators, who then turn to new practices. It is clear
that such a system will always feature variation in cultural practices. And
we can see that such a TFP distribution will also generate signiﬁcant
change in cultural practices over time. That is, the system will exhibit
fashion dynamics.
Now consider how a population-level shift in the TFP distribution
would turn on or turn off the fashion engine. Lieberson ð2000, pp. 66–68Þ
and Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ show that in the 19th century, naming
patterns in the West underwent a phase shift from being governed by
tradition ðwith very little variety and changeÞ to being governed by fashion
ðgreater variety and changeÞ. For example, throughout the 16th and 17th
centuries in England, nearly half of all boys were named William, John,
or Thomas ðSmith-Bannister 1997; cited in Lieberson and Lynn 2003,
p. 238Þ. By contrast, in 2000 in the United States, the three most popular
boys’ names accounted for only 4.6% of boys. Furthermore, one of these
names had not been in the top three a decade earlier, indicating fairly rapid
change in the popularity distribution. Lieberson ð2000, pp. 66–68Þ and
Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ posit that this historical shift in the typical
person’s TFP away from conformity and toward differentiation was
brought about by a range of exogenous factors summarized as “the rise of
individualism.”
Extending Lieberson’s logic, we suggest that such a shift in TFP can be
reversed by political processes that shift a typical person’s TFP away from
differentiation and toward conformity. This mechanism underlies a second
way in which politics might inﬂuence culture and lead to the freezing of
fashion. Consider that at one extreme, if everyone has a very high TFP,
there will no longer be any innovators to create cultural variety and serve
as the engine of change. Thus, if exogenous ðpoliticalÞ conditions can shift
the average TFP toward this extreme, they will dampen fashion. Below,
we will develop the idea ðdrawn from the literatures on status and con-
formity and from the events of the Cultural RevolutionÞ that a typical
person’s TFP is inﬂuenced by how secure she feels about her group mem-
bership. We argue that during periods of political turmoil, such as the
Cultural Revolution, the pervasive sense of insecurity might shift a typical
person’s taste for popularity toward more conformity and less differenti-
ation, dampening the operation of the fashion mechanism.561
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AlTHE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND NAMING PRACTICES
Having clariﬁed how politics can shape culture through the repertoire shift
and the TFP shift, we next provide historical evidence to support our ar-
gument that both of these mechanisms affected naming practices at the
onset of the Cultural Revolution. But before doing so, it is worth empha-
sizing certain distinctive aspects of Chinese naming practices that are im-
portant for understanding our case. To begin, the meaning of a Chinese
person’s name is salient to her. Traditionally, Chinese names have three
parts, each represented by a single character: a surname, a generational
name ðgiven to all members of a lineage born in a given generationÞ, and a
given name. In modern China, generational names have fallen into disuse
and two-character given names have become common ðZhu and Mill-
ward 1987, p. 15Þ. Each character making up a name is a unit of meaning
on its own; this meaning can also be modiﬁed by the characters preceding
and following it ðSung 1981, pp. 72–85Þ. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, this fact makes it more likely that names in China are subject to the
regime’s efforts to reshape cultural repertoires than are names in Western
societies, where a name’s meaning is less salient ðcf. Weitman 1987Þ.
In addition, we argue that Chinese given names are also likely to be
subject to the TFP-shift effect. Since given names are all-purpose markers
of identity that individuals use across social situations—including inter-
actions with the state—we expect Chinese parents to be especially con-
servative in choosing given names for their children. It is important to note
in this regard that the Chinese often avoid using ofﬁcial given names in
interaction among family members, friends, or even acquaintances. It is
very common in China, as in other cultures, to use pet names or nicknames
within one’s family or local community ðon “milk” names, see Sung ½1981,
pp. 69–70Þ. Among friends and acquaintances, it is common to use ﬁctive
kinship terms such as “older sister” or nicknames that combine an indi-
vidual’s last name with a short description, such as “little Zhang” ðon
nicknames, see Zhu and Millward ½1987, pp. 18–20Þ. Ofﬁcial names are
therefore expressly designed for public situations and interactions with the
state ðScott, Tehranian, and Mathias 2002Þ.
Chinese naming practices characteristically differ from those typical in
the West in at least two ways that are important for our study.
Greater variety.—We expect to see a much greater variety of names in
our data than Lieberson reports in theWest for at least three reasons. First,
almost any character can be used in a name, and some parents slightly alter
existing characters. Second, a distinctive aspect of Chinese naming prac-
tices is the general custom of “family avoidance”—a taboo against publicly
speaking the name of an ancestor ðSung 1981, pp. 87–88Þ. This means that
Chinese avoid naming their children after relatives—living or dead ðcf. Rossi562
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When Politics Froze Fashion1965Þ. Third, the Chinese language has a very limited number of surnames:
only 5,652 have ever been recorded ðHang 1981; cited in Zhu and Millward
½1987, p. 9Þ. As a result, there is a much stronger tendency to choose un-
common given names ðSung 1981, p. 88; Watson 1986, p. 622Þ. For ex-
ample, Watson reports that “the Chinese ﬁnd the idea of sharing one’s
given name with millions of other people extraordinary” ðp. 622Þ, and Sung
ð1981Þ describes ofﬁcial policies on name changing by the Taiwanese gov-
ernment, which are designed to avoid confusion among people with the
same name.5
Girls’ names.—Until recently, girls’ names were not more fashion driven
than boys’ names, as they are in most Western societies. Historically,
because of the low status of women in Chinese society, the Chinese have
paid less attention to their daughters’ names than to their sons’ names. For
example, an ethnographer of rural Hong Kong in the 1960s describes
women as “nameless”: at marriage, they lost their baby names and became
known and referred to by their relationships ðe.g., as “wife of Li” or
“mother of Zhang”Þ and, in old age, simply as “an old woman” ðWatson
1986; cf. Sung 1981, p. 89Þ. As the status of women in Chinese society
improved following the Communist Revolution, parents started to pay
more attention to their daughters’ names. However, because of ðaÞ the
expense of obtaining both girls’ and boys’ names and ðbÞ the issue of how
changes in the social status of women might complicate the interpretation
of the results for girls’ names, we decided to focus our analyses on boys’
names ðbut see Obukhova et al. 2011Þ.
The Two Mechanisms in Historical Context
In this section, after a brief historical overview of the onset of the Cultural
Revolution in Beijing, we review suggestive historical evidence for the two
mechanisms we proposed, especially as they relate to naming.
On May 16, 1966, the Cultural Revolution was ofﬁcially launched in a
politburo notiﬁcation that announced a purge of Beijing’s mayor.6 On
May 25, seven Peking University professors posted a “big-character” poster
denouncing the university party hierarchy.7 On June 1 and 2, the contents5Similar restrictions are known in other labor markets. For example, the Screen Actors
Guild does not allow two members to have the same name ðsee http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Stage_nameÞ. This is an important impetus for the generation of unusual names in
Hollywood.
6Our account of these events is primarily based on MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
ð2006Þ and Walder ð2009Þ.
7These were posters written in large characters and posted in public places for passersby
to read.
563
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Alof the poster were broadcast nationally and published in all of China’s
newspapers, making ordinary Chinese aware that something extraordi-
nary was going on in the capital. Events in Beijing moved rapidly: over
the next two weeks, work teams composed of outside cadres descended on
universities and secondary schools to evaluate the performance of their
party hierarchies.8 The extent of the purges varied by school, but when
they were over, more than half of the university party secretaries had been
branded as antiparty reactionaries ðWalder 2009, p. 57Þ.
The events surrounding the purges of the party hierarchy gave rise to a
large-scale mobilization of university and secondary-school students who
became known as Red Guards and played an important role in shaping
events over the following months.9 After the publication of the Peking
University poster, all universities and secondary schools in Beijing sus-
pended classes and students were encouraged to engage in politics. During
June, at Tsinghua University in Beijing alone, 65,000 big-character post-
ers were put up ðMacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, p. 67Þ. Across Bei-
jing’s universities, Red Guards primarily focused on the actions of the
work teams sent to their campuses ðWalder 2009Þ. In contrast, secondary-
school Red Guards did not limit their concerns to their schools’ political
hierarchies, but also went on violent rampages through their cities with the
diffuse goal of remaking China’s culture. As these events unfolded, the
party leaders—and even Mao himself—found themselves increasingly un-
able ðor unwillingÞ to control the direction and violence of the movement.The Repertoire-Shift Effect
In the summer of 1966, the actions of the Red Guards in Beijing, partic-
ularly those drawn from secondary schools, had important effects on cul-
ture. These Red Guards terrorized Beijing, attacking any manifestation of
the “Four Olds” decried by Mao: old habits, old routines, old thoughts, and
old culture. The methods of delegitimizing cultural practices were public
and violent and included searching households and destroying objects con-
sidered “feudal” or “bourgeois.”During the month of August, 114,000 homes
were searched, and 2.3 million books and 3.3 million paintings, art objects,
and pieces of furniture were conﬁscated ðWalder 2009, p. 145Þ. During the
entire Cultural Revolution in Beijing, three out of four ðor 4,922 out of 6,843Þ8 In China, secondary schools that offer six years of postprimary education are typically
known as middle schools.
9Red Guards were not a uniﬁed force. Rather, asWalder ð2009, p. 174Þwrites, “the basic
building block of the red guard movement was a small group of students, usually no
more than ten to ﬁfteen individuals from the same classroom, who pledged allegiance to
broader factional groupings as they formed.” The ﬁrst Red Guard group emerged in the
secondary school afﬁliated with Tsinghua University on May 29, 1966.
564
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When Politics Froze Fashion“places of cultural or historical interest” were destroyed, most of the destruc-
tion taking place between August and September of 1966 ðMacFarquhar
and Schoenhals 2006, p. 118Þ. Those whom the Red Guards found to be
harboring “decadent” or “bourgeois” items had their hair forcefully shaved
in a ying-and-yang style ðying yang touÞ, where the hair on one half of the
head was chopped short and the hair on the other half was shaved clean
ðWen 1995, p. 10Þ.
In their attempts to remove “feudal” and “bourgeois” inﬂuences on
Chinese culture, the Red Guards did not overlook names. One Red Guard
group campaigned for Beijing to be renamed “East Is Red City” ðMac-
Farquhar and Schoenhals 2006, p. 119Þ. As summarized by MacFarquhar
and Schoenhals, Red Guard factions attempted to rename many prom-
inent landmarks in the city to reﬂect their ideology: “Perhaps the most
harmless part of the movement was the changing of names—streets, shops,
schools, theaters, restaurants, hospitals, newspapers, journals. . . . In
Beijing, Zhou Enlai allowed the name of the road on which the Soviet em-
bassy was located to be ofﬁcially changed from Yangwei Street to Anti-
Revisionism street, as requested by the Red Guards” ðpp. 114–15Þ.
Personal names were also subject to change. The most famous incident
involving a change of a given name occurred during the mass rally in
Tiananmen Square on August 18, 1966.10 At this rally, Mao symbolically
endorsed the Red Guard movement by accepting an armband from a
secondary-school student who had been involved in the violent actions
that led to the death of a teacher at her school. The report in the press re-
lated that, upon learning that her given name was Binbin—meaning “re-
ﬁned and courteous”—Mao suggested that she change her name to Yaowu,
meaning “be martial.” Similarly, Lu and Millward ð1989Þ report that dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, a student voluntarily changed his name from
XueRu,meaning “to learn fromConfucius,” toXueBiao,meaning “to learn
from Lin Biao,”who at the time was a defense minister groomed to be Mao’s
successor. Another student was forced to change his name from Zhongli,
meaning “remain neutral,” to Zuo, meaning “left.”
It is worth noting that none of these name changes resulted from an
explicit regime policy. With the exception of the renaming of Song Binbin
in Tiananmen Square, there is no evidence that Mao or anyone close to
him explicitly encouraged the adoption of politically desirable names or ac-
tively discouraged the adoption of names considered politically illegitimate.
In fact, by December 1966, Premier Zhou Enlai, known to be a moderate in10This story appearswith slight variations in various accounts ðsee LuandMillward 1989,
p. 268; Honig 2002, p. 259; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, p. 108Þ. Also, seeMorn-
ing Sun: A Film about the Cultural Revolution ð2003Þ, a documentary by Carma Hinton.
The relevant clip is posted at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v5hLtoZTLMR3k.
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Althis period, repudiated the extent of the name changing. Citing Mao’s au-
thority, he told a group of Red Guards that, “As for names, as long as they’re
not too feudal or too backward, then they’re all right” ðMacFarquhar and
Schoenhals 2006, p. 116Þ. In this respect, the Maoist intervention into nam-
ing was far less extensive than some interventions in other times and places.11
From the anecdotes about name changing related above, we might
surmise that the events at the onset of the Cultural Revolution altered the
repertoire from which parents picked names for their children. And we
expect such a repertoire shift to have a characteristic effect on popular
names; it will increase the popularity of practices reﬂecting the prevailing
political ideology. Indeed, some evidence suggests that this did occur dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. For example, Lu andMillward’s ð1989Þ study
of students in Nianjing shows a high incidence of “political” names among
children born during the Cultural Revolution, and Friedman, Pickowicz,
and Selden ð2005, p. 101Þ report that about half of the children born during
the “high tide” of the Cultural Revolution in the model village of Wugong
in Hebei Province were given “revolutionary” names. Also note that a
sudden repertoire shift will produce a short-term spike in turnover, as po-
litically desirable practices replace previously popular practices that either
are politically neutral or have become politically undesirable.The TFP-Shift Effect
In addition to the shift in the repertoire of names discussed above, we con-
tend that the onset of the Cultural Revolution induced a shift in the TFP
distribution, dampening the endogenous processes that drive fashion. This
argument derives from the lesson derives from the literature on status and
conformity ðsee Phillips and Zuckerman 2001; Phillips, Turco, and Zuck-
erman 2013Þ that in order to publicly engage in practices that are unusual
ðand potentially seen as deviantÞ among categorymembers, individualsmust
feel a sense of security or “unquestioned ½category membership” ðHughes
1946Þ. In many contexts, high-status individuals are more likely to feel such
security, allowing them to engage in rare practices with the conﬁdence that
this will not raise questions about their competence or commitment ðPhillips
et al. 2013Þ. Accordingly, Simmel ð1957Þ argues that the tendency to conform
rather than differentiate reﬂects the “weakness” of an actor’s social position.1211See, for instance, the long-standing guidelines for legitimate names in the French legal
code, the German Namensänderungsverordnung policy of 1938, or Turkish restrictions
on Kurdish names ðAslan 2009Þ.
12Note that even actors who differentiate tend to do so in very limited fashion, by
conforming on most available dimensions of difference and by avoiding practices that
would clearly convey incompetence or a lack of commitment ðsee Zuckerman, in pressÞ.
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When Politics Froze FashionAccordingly, considerable research shows that immigrants who give their
children host-society names tend to select the most prevalent ones ðSue and
Telles 2007; Watkins and London 1994; Lieberson 2000, chap. 7; Zhang,
Zuckerman, and Obukhova 2013Þ.13
Moreover, while such research shows how greater conformity in a sub-
group derives from group members’ relative lack of security as members
of a larger society, this logic can be extended to situations in which vir-
tually everyone experiences a high level of insecurity about their stand-
ing with respect to the regime and thus prefers more popular cultural prac-
tices. In such contexts, latent suspicions about the commitment or loyalties of
all actors—and perhaps especially high-status actors who can be accused of
having feigned loyalty to get ahead ðcf. Phillips et al. 2013; Hahl and Zuck-
erman 2014Þ—rise to the foreground.
The onset of the Cultural Revolution engendered such conditions. The
Red Guard factions delivered severe punishments to those they perceived
as engaging in deviant behavior or even likely to engage in such behavior.
During the summer of 1966, those accused of being counterrevolutionary
were subjected to humiliation and even violence during public “struggle
sessions”—rallies at which one or more individuals had to answer accu-
sations and confess their alleged crimes. Many secondary schools and uni-
versities set up makeshift prisons where Red Guards kept and tortured
their prisoners, including party cadres, teachers, and fellow students. As a
result, for August alone, the death toll in the capital reached 1,772 ðWalder
2009, p. 145Þ. And by the end of the summer, some 77,000 residents from
“bad” backgrounds, or nearly 2% of Beijing’s population, had been forced
to return to their ancestral villages ðMacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006,
p. 123Þ. Despite this escalation of violence, directives were issued to army
and public security units on August 21 and 22 prohibiting them from in-
terfering with Red Guard actions, however violent.
While penalties for engaging in deviant behavior were severe, there was
intense ambiguity about what constitutes a correct pattern of behavior. For13 In addition to the most secure actors, very-low-status actors can also be expected to
engage in rare practices. Insofar as they are outsiders effectively barred from recognition
as members of a category, they can be expected to cease identifying with it ðPhillips and
Zuckerman 2001Þ. Accordingly, Varnum and Kitayama ð2011Þ show that parents in
frontier settlements in the United States and Canada, who were largely excluded from
the status ordering of the established settlements, picked more unusual names than
parents in established settlements. Similarly, Lieberson and Mikelson ð1995Þ document
a trend among African-Americans to invent unusual names for their children, consistent
with a lack of identiﬁcation with the mainstream white culture. Note that this trend
began after the Civil Rights movement, when African-Americans achieved a certain
level of political security ði.e., such that asserting their legal rights did not depend on
cultural conformityÞ. Thus, this case seems to involve two mechanisms that heighten the
willingness to engage in rare practices.
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Alexample, Walder ð2009, p. 13Þ writes that “in China’s schools during the
summer of 1966, the institutions that stabilized expectation about author-
ity and linked one’s status and position to political response were breaking
down rapidly in novel and unpredictable ways. The signals about expected
behavior, very clear in stable circumstances, were suddenly scrambled.”
Similarly, one Englishman teaching in Beijing recalled how he tried to
make sense of what was going on following the purge of Beijing’s mayor:
“When the ﬁrst work groups came into the school I asked my most intel-
ligent grad student ðfrom ShanghaiÞ what was going on; ‘I haven’t a clue,’
he said. ‘Can’t you sit on the fence until things are clearer?’ I asked him.
‘No,’ he said; ‘you have to choose one line or the other.’ ‘But surely you can
sense which is going to win?’ I asked him. ‘No, it is quite impossible. You
just have to jump’” ðcited in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals ½2006, p. 59Þ.
Even high status could not protect one from the possibility of making a
wrong choice. High-status party ofﬁcials were the ﬁrst victims of the
purges ðWalder 2009Þ.14 And nobody was safe from the Red Guards’ ac-
cusations, even previously untouchable party members such as those who
had joined the party before the revolution or had spent time in the revo-
lutionary base in Yan’an. Consider, for example, the following dialogue
recounted in a memoir of the Cultural Revolution: “ ‘Doesn’t your position
as a delegate to the Political Consultative Conference give you some pro-
tection?’ I asked my friend ðLi ChenÞ. ‘I hear the Maoists want to abolish
that organization. They call it a collection of radishes, red on the outside
but white inside. They claim that while all the delegates talked as if they
supported the Communist Party, in actual fact they oppose the party,’ she
said” ðCheng 1986, p. 74Þ.15
While we cannot directly measure the degree of insecurity individuals
felt, it is reasonable to surmise that, under such circumstances, everyone
experienced signiﬁcant insecurity about his or her standing with the re-
gime. As a result, we expect that the onset of the Cultural Revolution
triggered a population-level shift in TFP toward more conformity.
In the realm of names, we expect that such a shift had two implications
for the shape of the popularity distribution. First, we expect that parents
chose more popular names for their children and avoided rare names.14As Phillips et al. ð2013Þ discuss, high status confers security in membership only
insofar as the achievement of status implies that the actor is committed to the audience
who confers status. But conditions like the Cultural Revolution explicitly undermine
this implication, as they suggest that those who have achieved high status had ulterior
motives and were faking their commitment ðcf. Hahl and Zuckerman 2014Þ.
15Li Chen was the head of the Piano Department at the Shanghai Conservatory of
Music. According to the memoir’s author, Li committed suicide ðone of thousands dur-
ing this periodÞ at her piano, unable to resist the pressure from the Red Guards.
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When Politics Froze FashionIndeed, some parents might have been wary of using a political name to
signal their commitment to the regime because of the dramatic—and often
rapid—changes in the party line and uncertainty about which political
faction would dominate. A vivid example of such a reversal is provided by
Friedman et al. ð2005, p. 101Þ: A boy was named Xuesu, or “emulate the
Soviet Union,” in the early 1950s but was renamed Pixiu, or “criticize
revisionism,” in a futile attempt to stave off bullying and beating during the
Cultural Revolution when the post-Stalin USSR was viliﬁed as having
betrayed socialism. In addition, we expect that a TFP shift will lead to a
decline in cultural change because fewer members of the population adopt
new practices, slowing down the engine of fashion.DATA, METHOD, AND MEASUREMENT
The data for this study come from National Citizen Identity Information
Center ðNCIICÞ, managed by China’s Ministry of Public Security ðMPSÞ.
Under the household registration system ðhukou zhiduÞ introduced at the
inception of the People’s Republic of China ðPRCÞ in 1949, the MPS re-
cords and manages the information ðincluding name, birth date, gender,
and addressÞ of all citizens. In the early 2000s, the MPS, as part of its
program of replacing paper identity cards with smart cards, compiled a
digital record of all individuals with identity cards. The MPS database
records people’s current names, but because registering a name change
with the MPS is a cumbersome process, we expect that these data are a
fairly accurate reﬂection of names given at birth. When our data were
compiled, people born at the onset of the Cultural Revolution would have
been in their early 40s, and since the life expectancy of that cohort is over
50 years, it is not likely that mortality signiﬁcantly inﬂuences our results.
We obtained data on the names of male Beijing residents born every
other month between January 1964 and November 1969. We decided to
focus on Beijing because it was the epicenter of the Cultural Revolution
and events there are relatively well documented compared to other areas
of China ðWalder and Su 2003; Walder 2009Þ. We can therefore beneﬁt
from the well-established chronology to explore how particular historical
events shaped the popularity distribution of boys’ given names. Because it
is possible that, among male residents of Beijing during our study period,
some were born outside of Beijing and later migrated there, we restricted
our data collection to the oldest areas of the city: the Dongcheng, Xicheng,
Chongwen, and Xuanwu districts located inside the second ring road.
Since these districts are the most densely populated, we believe that they
received the fewest in-migrants.
For each of these 36 months, we obtained a list of the 30 most popular
boys’ names and the share of all newborn boys they represent. Ideally, we569
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Alwould have preferred to obtain a list of all names, but NCIIC’s pricing
policies made this impossible. Instead, because we expect to ﬁnd a greater
variety of names in China than in Western cultures ðas discussed aboveÞ,
we also obtained the share of boys who had any one of the 1,000 most
popular boys’ names, but not the names themselves. These data provide a
robustness check for our analyses of cultural variety, but since we do not
know the names themselves, we cannot use them to calculate cultural
change among the top 1,000 names. Despite their limitations, our data com-
pare favorably with data used in the study of Western names, which typi-
cally uses fewer than 30 names ðe.g., Lieberson 2000, chap. 2; Lieberson and
Lynn 2003Þ.
Note ﬁnally that our analysis is a quasi experiment with a before-and-
after design without a control group. To ﬁnd a control group, we would
need a setting that was comparable to Beijing in all respects except for not
having received the “treatment” of the Cultural Revolution. After careful
consideration, we concluded that no such control group exists. The prob-
lem with constructing a control group from Taiwan or Hong Kong is that
they were quite different from Beijing prior to the onset of the Cultural
Revolution. Moreover, while it was once thought that the Cultural Rev-
olution was heavily centered in Beijing ðthus affording the possibility of
control groups from elsewhere in the PRCÞ, it is now understood that the
Cultural Revolution’s effects spread very rapidly and took different forms
across different regions of China ðseeWalder and Su 2003Þ. Thus, as in any
before-and-after design, the key assumption underlying our ability to draw
causal inferences is that nothing else changed about Beijing in the summer
of 1966 that could affect fashion in naming and competed with the effects
of the Cultural Revolution. On the basis of the historical record, we believe
that this is a safe assumption.ANALYSES
The Repertoire-Shift Effect
We argue that a shift in the cultural repertoire at the onset of the Cultural
Revolution should be characterized by an increase in the prevalence of
practices reﬂecting the prevailing political ideology. To evaluate whether
such a shift occurred, we begin by identifying names with politically de-
sirable content. First, we compiled a list of the 108 names that appeared
among the 30 most popular boys’ names in any of the months for which we
obtained data. Then, we asked seven individuals from the PRC over the
age of 60 ði.e., at least 11 years old at the beginning of our study periodÞ to
identify names that “reﬂected the political culture during the Cultural Rev-
olution.” Because we were concerned that the raters might simply identify570
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When Politics Froze Fashionnames that they remember as being prevalent during the Cultural Revolu-
tion rather than names that reﬂected its ideology, we asked another seven
raters to identify from the same list names that “reﬂected the political culture
after the founding of the PRC.”16
In table 1, we list every third name that appeared on our list of 108, its
approximate English translation, and whether our raters identiﬁed it as
a politically desirable name. In columns 1 and 3, we display names that
raters unanimously identiﬁed as reﬂecting political content for the narrow
and broad deﬁnitions, respectively. In columns 2 and 4, we present names
that the majority ði.e., at least four out of sevenÞ identiﬁed as reﬂecting
political content for the narrow and broad deﬁnitions, respectively. Not
surprisingly, all raters agreed that the name “Cultural Revolution” re-
ﬂected the political culture of the Cultural Revolution. The majority of
raters also identiﬁed “Protect East,” “Learn from Army,” “Loyal,” “Forever
Red,” “Love Army,” and “Red” as reﬂecting the political culture of the
Cultural Revolution. All raters agreed that “Protect East,” “Learn from
Army,” and “Cultural Revolution” reﬂected PRC political culture, and the
majority also identiﬁed “East,” “Army,” “Nation Red,” “Build Nation,”
“Build Loyalty,” “Build People,” “Aim for Army,” “Loyal,” “Forever Red,”
“Love Army,” “Red,” and “Unity” as reﬂecting PRC political culture. It is
plausible that some of these names, such as “Build Nation,” reﬂect themes
of nation building that are more emblematic of the period immediately
after the founding of the PRC in 1949.
The evidence presented in ﬁgure 1 indicates that the onset of the Cul-
tural Revolution in Beijing had a profound effect on the repertoire of boys’
names. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that in all periods before the summer of 1966,
no more than 7% of the top 30 names were identiﬁed by the majority of
raters as reﬂecting the political culture of the Cultural Revolution, but in
May 1966, this was true of 10% of those names and, by September, more
than 25%. Similarly, in all periods before the summer of 1966, no more
than 50% of the top 30 boys’ names were identiﬁed by a majority of raters
as reﬂecting the PRC political culture, but in September 1966, this was true
for more than 70% of the top 30 names. The patterns for names that raters
unanimously agreed reﬂected Cultural Revolution or PRC political culture
are substantively similar. The proportion of the top 30 names that met this
criterion increased substantially in the summer of 1996, peaking in Sep-
tember. Also note that while the prevalence of political names declined16For both questions, there was considerable agreement among our raters. For the
narrower deﬁnition, the correlations ranged from .62 to .16, with an average of .44. For
the broader deﬁnition, the correlations ranged from .72 to .24, with an average of .44.
571
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.063 on May 23, 2017 10:11:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE 1
Examples of Boys’ Names in Our Sample, Their Approximate English Translations,

















东 East 0 0 0 1
健 Healthy 0 0 0 0
军 Army 0 0 0 1
利 Beneﬁt 0 0 0 0
卫东 Protect East 0 1 1 1
国华 NationFlourishing 0 0 0 0
国红 Nation Red 0 0 0 1
学军 Learn from Army 0 1 1 1
岩 Rock 0 0 0 0
庆 Celebration 0 0 0 0
建华 Build Nation 0 0 0 1
建忠 Build Loyalty 0 0 0 1
建民 Build People 0 0 0 1
志军 Aim for Army 0 0 0 1
忠 Loyal 0 1 0 1
振江 Shake River 0 0 0 0
文华 Literacy Flourishing 0 0 0 0
文革 CulturalRevolution 1 1 1 1
明 Bright 0 0 0 0
晓东 Dawn East 0 0 0 0
林 Woods 0 0 0 0
永红 Forever Red 0 1 0 1
波 Wave 0 0 0 0
涛 Billows 0 0 0 0
爱军 Love Army 0 0 0 1
玉春 Jade Spring 0 0 0 0
秀华 ElegantFlourishing 0 0 0 0
秀荣 Elegant Glorious 0 0 0 0
红 Red 0 1 0 1
联合 Unity 0 0 0 1
英 Hero 0 0 0 0
辉 Splendor 0 0 0 0
金龙 Golden Dragon 0 0 0 0
静 Peace 0 0 0 0
龙 Dragon 0 0 0 0
NOTE.—In the table, 1 denotes a name identiﬁed as political and 0 otherwise.
American Journal of Sociology
Alover the following two years, it never reached levels as low as before the
Cultural Revolution, except for those names unanimously identiﬁed as
reﬂecting the political culture of the Cultural Revolution. In sum, we have
compelling evidence that the onset of the Cultural Revolution is associated
with a shift in cultural repertoire.572
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FIG. 1.—Prevalence of political names among top 30 names given to boys born in
Beijing before and after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. CR 4/7 and CR7/7 are the
proportion of names that at least four out of seven or all seven raters, respectively,
identiﬁed as “reﬂecting the political culture during the Cultural Revolution.” PRC 4/7
and PRC 7/7 are the proportion of names that at least four out of seven or all seven raters,
respectively, identiﬁed as “reﬂecting the political culture after the founding of the PRC.”
When Politics Froze FashionThe TFP-Shift Effect
We argued that a shift in TFP should be reﬂected in a decline in cultural
variety and change. We begin by analyzing cultural variety. To evaluate
whether such a shift has occurred, we examine the proportion of boys who
had one of the 30 most popular names and one of the 1,000 most popular
names. The results for top 30 share, presented in ﬁgure 2, indicate a sub-
stantial increase in the prevalence of themost popular names in the summer
of 1996. Speciﬁcally, before March 1966, a little over 5% of newborn boys
were given one of the top 30 names. But among boys born in September
1966, almost 10% were. The results for top 1,000 share show a similar,
though less dramatic, increase over the summer of 1966—from about 35%
to about 45%. In sum, the evidence points to a substantial decline in cul-
tural variety after the onset of the Cultural Revolution that is consistent
with a TFP shift.
We proceed to examine how the onset of the Cultural Revolution af-
fected the turnover in the most popular names. One way to measure turn-573
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FIG. 2.—Share of newborn boys in Beijing given one of top 30 or top 1,000 most
popular names before and after the onset of the Cultural Revolution.
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Alover is to follow Lieberson and Lynn ð2003, p. 264Þ, who for each name cal-
culate the difference in the share of population that uses this name between
the two time points and then sum the absolute values of the differences
across names. However, this simple measure has an important shortcoming
that is likely to lead to misleading results in our case ðsee Zhang et al. 2013Þ.
Consider that if the ranking of the top n names remained stable but the
share of the population who had one of the top n names declined, Lieberson
and Lynn’s measure would indicate an increase in turnover. As our analy-
ses of cultural variety indicate, such a change did indeed occur during the
onset of the Cultural Revolution, necessitating a change in our analytical
strategy.
To avoid this problem, following Zhang et al. ð2013Þ, we calculated
“adjusted turnover,” under the assumption that the distribution of names
follows a power law that is constant across periods. That is, using the
name’s rank, we assign each name an expected frequency of usage based
on all historical periods for which we have data. This ensures that across
time periods in which the cumulative share of top n names changes, names
of similar rank contribute comparable amounts to changes in adjusted
turnover.
The evidence presented in ﬁgure 3 provides important evidence for the
“freezing” of fashion after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Speciﬁcally,
the results for our measure of adjusted turnover indicate a decline in turn-574
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FIG. 3.—Adjusted turnover in the top 30 names given to boys born in Beijing before
and after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Turnover ðpolyﬁtÞ is best-ﬁtting poly-
nomial ﬁt line of 11 degrees.
When Politics Froze Fashionover after the summer of 1966. Also note that this decrease is particularly
impressive considering that we might expect a temporary increase in turn-
over due to the replacement of politically neutral and politically undesirable
names with politically desirable names ðas shown in ﬁg. 1Þ. Furthermore,
this decline had long-lasting effects on naming fashion. Note that turnover
reaches its lowest point the following summer of 1967. Afterward, it rises
gradually but never recovers the levels reached before the onset of the Cul-
tural Revolution. In sum, our results point to a substantial decline in cultural
change after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The combination of this
evidence and our evidence for the decline in cultural variety provides strong
support for the shift in TFP toward more conformity.CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The contributions of our study can be appreciated by situating it relative to
the distinct literatures on ðaÞ the political culture of authoritarian regimes,575
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AlðbÞ the effect of exogenous and endogenous factors on cultural variety and
change, and ðcÞ the rise and fall of individualism.
With regard to the ﬁrst literature, our study suggests that individuals
might adopt politically desirable practices not simply because they wish to
signal commitment to the regime’s speciﬁc ideology, but also because these
practices are more popular and thus safer. Consider the following dilemma
that any citizen faced during the Cultural Revolution:Which names will be
regarded as politically desirable? The answer to that question being so
unclear, a straightforward solution would be to select a name that not
only appears to be politically desirable but also has already been adopted
by many fellow citizens. That is, such a context produces a high taste for
popularity as a basis for selection among politically desirable forms of ex-
pression. Accordingly, it is possible that a shift in TFP is partly responsible
for the increased prevalence of names with politically desirable content.
And more generally, this may help explain why the ideology of authori-
tarian regimes enjoys wide public endorsement even when such regimes
engender private dissent ðcf. Havel 1985; Kuran 1995;Wedeen 1999Þ. Once
such public enactments are widespread, they become shields behind which
to hide, regardless of their content.
Second, our study makes two important contributions in the context of
the recent trend in the sociology of culture to emphasize endogenous pro-
cesses in cultural change. On the one hand, we have shown a clear reﬂection-
theoretic effect, whereby there is a change in the content of cultural ex-
pression based on changes in the political regime. That is, after the onset of
the Cultural Revolution, parents were more likely than before to select a
politically desirable name. This exogenous effect of politics on culture is not
surprising, given that we chose our research site precisely because China
during the Cultural Revolution is a case very different from the liberal West-
ern societies that Lieberson ð2000Þ, Lieberson and Lynn ð2003Þ, and other
recent researchers ðe.g., Gerhards and Hackenbroch 2000; Gerhards 2005Þ
have analyzed. In particular, our case is distinctive because of both the
greater salience of the meaning of Chinese names ðcf. Weitman 1987Þ and
the breadth and depth of political intervention into culture during the
Cultural Revolution.While these factors make this case unique, it cannot be
ignored if we are to have a general theory of how exogenous and endoge-
nous processes affect cultural expression.
We have also shown that there is more to the exogenous effect of politics
on culture than to promote ideas reﬂecting the prevailing political ideology
ðsee also Fishman and Lizardo 2013Þ. The key empirical results of our
article are that after the onset of the Cultural Revolution, parents weremore
likely than before to select a popular name and there was less turnover in
the popularity distribution.We argued that these results are consistent with576
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When Politics Froze Fashiona more subtle effect of politics on culture; that is, by lowering the degree of
securitywith respect to expressionsof difference, the regime can shift a typical
person’s TFP toward a preference for conformity, which, in turn, suppresses
the endogenous mechanisms that drive fashion ðcf. Lieberson 2000; Lie-
berson and Lynn 2003Þ. The major limitation of our analysis is that, even
though there is strong support in the historical record for the idea that the
level of political security decreased sharply in the early summer of 1966, we
could not measure Chinese parents’ TFP or how it changed over time. We
can therefore say only that the empirical data are consistent with this hy-
pothesis. In addition, there is strong support in the historical record for the
idea that the level of political security decreased sharply in the early summer
of 1966.
Finally, our results have important implications for our understanding
of how social conditions promote or dampen expressions of individuality.
While the dividing line between premodern and modern society is noto-
riously difﬁcult to identify, Lieberson’s ð2000, chap. 2Þ research provides
clear and compelling evidence that in at least one respect—parental choice
of given names for children—something fundamental changed in many
Western societies during the 18th and 19th centuries. This naturally raises
the question of why this shift occurred. Lieberson attributes the shift in the
taste for popularity distribution to a cluster of changes associated with the
“rise of individualism” that accompanied the modernization of Western
societies ðpp. 66–68; see also Varnum and Kitayama 2011Þ. But what aspect
of modernization was responsible for this shift? This question seems quite
challenging, given the complexity of the processes associated with modern-
ization, including secularization, urbanization, changes in family structure,
and the increasing complexity of the economic structure. Our analysis can
hardly produce a deﬁnitive answer, but it does suggest two lessons for fu-
ture research.
First, modernization by itself may be insufﬁcient to induce the rise of
individualism—and especially the inclination to express individual dif-
ference. A long tradition in sociology, beginning with Durkheim ð½1893
1984Þ, describes individualism as stemming from the more elaborated di-
vision of labor in modern economies that produces more complex role-sets,
thereby heightening consciousness of social difference and creating a need
for “mental adjustments” that facilitate participation in a variety of seg-
mented roles and establish consistency ðCoser 1991, pp. 18–19Þ. But if
modernization is a sufﬁcient cause for the rise of individual expression, we
would not expect the fashion mechanism to operate any differently before
and after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. China under Mao experi-
enced the transformations that we identifywith the emergence ofmodernity
in the West, including secularization, urbanization, education reforms, de-577
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Alcreasing family size, and a highly elaborated division of labor, which make
it indisputably modern. Despite this modernization, we witnessed a dra-
matic decline in individualism during this period.
Second, our analysis is consistent with those scholars who link the rise of
individualism to the extension of citizenship rights ðsee Frank and Meyer
2002; Scott et al. 2002; Meyer 2010Þ. According to this view, the individual
becomes primary because she is granted certain basic rights by the liberal
nation-state that ensure her membership in the polity as long as she obeys
the law and regardless of any other identity or afﬁliation. Insofar as such
citizenship rights truly secure an individual’s membership in the polity, she
is authorized to have and exercise individual tastes ðFrank and Meyer
2002; Meyer 2010Þ. Our analysis is consistent with this perspective. People
who lived during the Cultural Revolution might have participated in a
complex division of labor and been torn from many of their traditional
roles and relational patterns. Moreover, they were given formal citizenship
rights. But their everyday experiences of such rights were tenuous to say
the least. And this insecurity in their membership in the polity conveyed a
sense that they had relatively little authorization to exercise individual
taste. That this effect is evident even in an area where the state made no
explicit claims testiﬁes to the power of the effect.APPENDIX
A Computational Model of Naming Fashion
In this appendix, we present a simple computation model that clariﬁes how
the TFP-shift mechanism inﬂuences the degree of fashion (i.e., the diversity
of cultural practices at a point in time and their change over time).
First, consider a population of N actors who, from a menu ofM (M ≥ N)
possible practices at any point in time, adopt P (P ≤ M) practices. We
randomly assign each actor a TFP (taste for popularity). We assume that
the TFP is normally distributed with a mean between 1% (i.e., on average
actors prefer practices that 1% of other actors adopt) and 20% (i.e., on
average actors prefer a practice that 20% of other actors adopt). We ex-
amined two levels of variance for the TFP distribution (SD 5 0.001 and
SD 5 0.006).17
In the initial state of the system (t 5 0), we randomly assign the P prac-
tices to the N actors and calculate the P practices’ initial popularities—the
popularity of a practice is the percentage of actors who adopt this prac-
tice. For instance, if we have 100 actors and 10 practices, the popularities17Because of low mean, to avoid negative values, 0.006 is the largest SD we can use for
a mean of 1%.
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popularities are all zero. In the models we present, we assume P5N5 100.18
At t 5 1, actors examine the actor calculates the differences between its
taste for popularity and the popularities of all practices, including the one
it currently adopts. If there is a practice whose popularity is closer to the
actor’s taste than the actor’s current practice, the actor will change its prac-
tice to the new one.19
We assumed that actors make decisions in a partially sequential fashion.
Speciﬁcally, we divided the N actors into K groups each of which has L
actors (K*L 5 N), and update the popularities of practices after every L
actors update their practices. In the base case, we set L 5 10; this means
that 10 actors search for a new practice simultaneously. We also explored
cases where L was set as high as L 5 100 (i.e., simultaneous choice) and as
low as L 5 0 (i.e., sequential choice). Turnover is limited at L 5 0, and be-
comes unrealistically high at L 5 100.
Illustrative results are presented in ﬁgures A1 and A2. In ﬁgure A1, we
show how rising mean TFP (with two different levels of variance) increases
the “market share” captured by the top 50 names and the top 10 names. As
one might expect, the effect is nonlinear, in that initial increases in TFP
sharply increase the share garnered by the most popular names, with the
effect diminishing as the share approaches its limit. In ﬁgure A2, we see a
roughly parallel effect of rising mean TFP on the rate of (adjusted) turnover
in what is popular.18Our models using 100 actors and 20 or 50 practices produced substantively similar
results.
19 If multiple practices meet this criterion, the actor will randomly pick one from them.
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AlFigure A1. Effect of rising TFP on share of top (10 and 50) names
Figure A2. Effect of mean TFP on (adjusted) turnoverREFERENCES
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